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Liberal communitarianism holds that a good society is based on a carefully crafted balance 
between individual rights and the common good; that both normative elements have the same 
fundamental standing and neither a priori trumps the other. Societies can lose the good 
balance either by becoming excessively committed to the common good (e.g. national 
security) or to individual rights (e.g. privacy). Even societies that have established a careful 
balance often need to recalibrate it following changes in historical conditions (such as the 
2001 attacks on the American homeland) and technological developments (such as the 
invention of smart cell phones).  
This article responds to those who reject the very conception of a common good (or the public 
interest) on a variety of philosophical and methodological grounds. It then asks how the 
American courts, in particular the Supreme Court, define the common good, what weight the 
courts have granted the common good versus individual rights, and what criteria they have 
employed in rendering these judgments in three key areas: that of free speech, public safety, 
and a major form of taking, that of eminent domain. 
To cover these vast subjects, the article by necessity employs very broad strokes. Readers 
may allow the author to indulge in these if they keep in mind that the article seeks to make 
merely a few limited points, though to make these requires covering a great deal of ground. 
What is considered a common good and the relative normative standing it commanded varied 
over history. These historical changes require a separate treatment, from society to society in 





I. WHAT IS A COMMON GOOD? 
 
The common good (alternatively called ‘the public interest’ or ‘public goods’) denotes those 
goods that serve all members of a given community and its institutions, and, as such, includes both 
goods that serve no identifiable particular group, as well as those that serve members of generations 
not yet born. It is a normative concept with a long and contested history. Philosophers, theologians, 
lawyers, politicians, and the public have arrived at distinct understandings about what the common 
good entails, how it should be balanced against individual goods, and if and by whom it should be 
enforced. Though there are many critics of the concept of the common good (discussed below), it has 
survived as a meaningful concept for well over two millennia, and continues to serve as a very 
significant organizing principle of civic and political life.   
The common good has deep roots in the history of philosophical and religious thought. For 
Plato ‘the good’ was objective, defined as that which “every soul pursues […] and does whatever it 
does for its sake.”3  Arriving at knowledge of the good within a community would create unity, which is 
“the greatest blessing for a state.”4  In this conception there is no tension between the private and 
public good, as individuals are thought to attain happiness (a private good) through the pursuit of 
justice (a public good). For Aristotle, “a polis exists for the sake of a good life,” and human beings, as 
political animals, lead a good life by contributing to the good of the community.5  He asks, What sort of 
people do we want society to form, and how should we structure society to accomplish this? This 
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question presupposes a society that has a shared end that both is separate from and actively shapes 
the good of the individual. The ancient Roman philosophers had a similarly robust conception of the 
common good. Cicero, writing around 50 B.C., defined a “people” or “republic” as “not any collection of 
human beings brought together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers 
associated in agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good.”6 
Often drawing on Greek and Roman tradition, Christian theologians have explored the 
common good. In City of God, Augustine takes up Cicero’s definition of a republic as a people joined 
by their pursuit of the common good, and specifies the content of that good from a Christian 
perspective: the good is none other than God, and to pursue the common good is to render unto God 
the love and worship that is His due. Thomas Aquinas maintains a theological conception of the 
common good: “God’s own goodness…is the good of the whole universe.”7 
The place of the common good in modern (neoclassical) economics has its origins in the 
Enlightenment conception of society as existing “in order to further the goals of individuals, neither 
asking where the goals of individuals come from, nor inquiring into the processes by which individuals 
are formed in society.”8 In neoclassical economics, the common good is not an objective goal to be 
discerned and pursued, but rather the aggregation of individual goods. This idea was first articulated 
by Adam Smith, who posited that man, in pursuing his own personal gain, unwittingly “promotes that of 
the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”9 
In this view, the common good—the summation of all private goods—arises naturally from 
economic exchanges, and no state efforts are needed to promote it. Indeed, attempts to guide the 
preferences of individuals towards a common goal are seen, at best, as paternalism, and at worst, as 
the first step on the road to totalitarianism, as was famously argued by Friedrich A. Hayek in The Road 
to Serfdom.10 
Economists, though, have introduced exceptions to this rule for situations in which the invisible 
hand is unable to provide “public goods” that benefit society at large. The market’s inability to produce 
such goods reflect what economists call a “market failure” (an instance where the market is unable to 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources) and thus government intervention in the production of 
these goods is tolerated. Examples of public goods include defense, basic research, and public health 
(e.g. fluoridation and vaccinations). Thus, Kenneth J. Arrow wrote that “we expect a free enterprise 
economy to underinvest in invention and research (as compared with an ideal) because it is risky, 
because the product can be appropriated only to a limited extent, and because of increasing returns in 
use. This underinvestment will be greater for more basic research.”11 
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The pluralist tradition of political science, which largely adopts the assumptions of neoclassical 
economics, has little room for a robust notion of the public interest, and in some cases criticizes such a 
notion as implicitly anti-democratic. Pluralist thinkers, drawing upon their theory’s economic 
underpinnings, argue that in a free and robust democracy competition among interest groups—which 
reveal and are guided by the preferences of individuals (i.e., private goods)—gives rise to a public 
policy that maximizes general welfare. The representative function of such a political system is 
preserved both because all individuals are free to associate with any number of these groups, and 
because each group can only exercise pressure equivalent to its popular support. Political scientists in 
the pluralist tradition readily criticize top-down notions of the public interest and the common good as 
inviting authoritarianism at the expense of procedural democracy. Thus, Frank Sorauf argued that the 
tug of war between private interests groups produces public policy superior to anything that would be 
reached by the state enforcing its own formulation of the public interest.12 
Critics argue that discrepancies in wealth, power, and social status give groups varying 
degrees of leverage over the government, and as a result public policy—based on interest group 
politics—does not maximize social welfare (i.e., that aggregation of individual goods), much less 
reflect a robustly defined common good, but rather serves the interests of the politically and 
economically powerful. Moreover, interest group pluralists fail to properly incorporate notions of the 
public good into their normative framework. 
In less individualistic societies—many of them non-Western—the value of the common good is 
rarely questioned. However, the normative status of the common good—unlike that of rights—is far 
from self-evident to many in the West. The use of the term ‘the common good’ is contested on a 
number of fronts. First, there are those who argue that it does not exist at all. Ayn Rand wrote that 
“Since there is no such entity as ‘the public,’ since the public is merely a number of individuals, the 
idea that ‘the public interest’ supersedes private interests and rights, can have but one meaning: that 
the interests and rights of some individuals take precedence over the interests and rights of others.”13 
Communitarians counter that the common good does not merely amount to an aggregation of 
all private or personal goods in a society. Contributions to the common good often offer no immediate 
payout or benefit. It is frequently impossible to predict who the beneficiaries will be in the long run. 
Still, members of communities that support the common good invest in it not because it will necessarily 
or even likely benefit them personally, or even their children, but simply because they consider it a 
good that ought to be nurtured. They consider it the right thing to do—by itself, for itself. This 
explanation surprises only those who claim that, even when we act in clearly altruistic ways, we 
always have an ulterior, self-serving motive. For everyone else, examples of such common goods are 
readily apparent: in addition to national defense and basic research, discussed above, public health 
and environmental preservation are widely accepted examples of common goods. The non-self-
interested nature of these measures stands out especially when serving the common good entails not 
merely some minor costs to the individual (e.g., taxes) but the existential risks of certain forms of 
service such as fighting for one’s country. 
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Protecting the environment, preventing climate change, and developing sustainable energy 
sources are all costly projects that will only pay off over the longer run, and then only to unknown, 
unpredictable beneficiaries. The millions of people who are working towards these goals today cannot 
be sure that they will be alive to see the full impact of their work. Self-interest-maximizing individuals 
would gain a much better rate of return on their money if they invested in readily-available financial 
instruments such as stocks and bonds, and then used the dividends to purchase air conditioners and 
sunscreen. 
In response to this account of the common good, libertarians have developed elaborate 
arguments that explain why people invest in these common goods that do not necessarily benefit 
them, without giving up on their assumption that people are rational utility maximizers. For example, 
Anthony Downs, Gordon Tullock, and William Riker all wondered why a rational actor would vote. 
These social scientists assumed that “the voter calculates the expected utility from each candidate’s 
victory, and naturally votes for the candidate whose policies promise the highest utility.”14 Yet the 
probability that any one voter’s ballot will affect the outcome of all but the closest elections is virtually 
zero. As voting always imposes at least some costs, costs that almost always outweigh the expected 
benefit, Downs et al. argued that people vote because they believe that the results will be close and 
hence their one vote could decide the election, a personal benefit that would offset the individual cost 
of their effort. However, it turns out that many millions vote even when elections are known not to be 
close. 
Moreover, the evidence shows that the most important factor that explains whether a person 
will vote is the extent to which the person considers voting his or her duty as a citizen. André Blais 
writes that “about half the electorate … vote out of a strong sense of moral obligation, because they 
believe it would be wrong not to vote; they do not calculate benefits and costs.”15 
A second criticism of the common good comes from those on the left who hold that the 
concept—as manifested, for instance, in the call to serve the ‘fatherland’ or ‘mother church’—serves to 
conceal class differences in economic interests and political power so as to keep those who are 
disadvantaged from making demands on the community. These critics are correct in asserting that this 
concept can be abused in this way. However, the fact that a concept is abused—a common fate of 
compelling concept—does not mean that it is without great merit. Otherwise, we would have to do 
away with such concepts as science, rationality, and community, all of which have been 
misappropriated. That said, one best considers what particular goods the calls to serve “the” common 
good seek to serve. 
Finally, several academic communitarians, in particular Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, 
argue that any conception of the good must be formulated on the social level, and that the community 
cannot be a normative-neutral realm. Moreover, unless there is a social formulation of the good, there 
can be no normative foundation for resolving conflicts of value between different individuals and 
groups. Such an overriding good (e.g., the national well-being) enables persons with different moral 
outlooks or ideological backgrounds to find principled (rather than merely prudential) common ground. 
                                                          
14
 Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III 304 (2003) 
15
 Andre Blais, To Vote or not to Vote?: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory 137 (2000) 
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Communities are the most likely source of particular specifications of the common good. Some 
have argued that the term ‘community’ is so vague it cannot even be defined. In contrast, 
communitarians hold that community can be clearly defined as a group of individuals that possesses 
two characteristics. The first is a web of affect-laden relationships which often crisscross and reinforce 
one another (rather than merely one-on-one or chain-like individual relationships). The second 
characteristic shared by the individuals of a community is some commitment to a core of shared 
values, norms, and meanings, as well as a collective history and identity—in short, a particularistic 
moral culture. Responsive (or liberal) communitarians hold that community is basically a major 
common good in itself as well as a major source of other common goods; “basically” because like all 
goods, community can take on dysfunctional forms, especially when its social bonds, culture, or 
political structure are oppressive. Hence the special import of balancing the community as a value with 
commitments to individual rights.  
To state that a given value is a common good of a given community does not mean that all the 
members subscribe to it, and surely not that they all live up to its dictates. It suffices that the value be 
recognizes as a common good by large majorities and be embodied in law and in other institutions. At 
the same time, a value to which members merely pay lip service cannot qualify. We shall see below 
that it is essential for solid analysis to consider the extent to which values are institutionalized as a 
continuous variable rather than as a dichotomous one. Some values are relatively highly 
institutionalized, e.g. marriages in the US in 1950s. Others are merely aspirational, e.g. the belief that 
US should promote democratic regimes overseas. The common good may be promoted and enforced 
by the state, but this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, often the core values are promoted by 
informal social controls, by peer pressures, and by communities. 
Particularly important and challenging is the observation that references to the common good 
should be read as if the emphasis is on the “common” and not on the “good”. For the following 
discussion, the main issue is whether a value is widely shared and institutionalized—not whether a 
particular ethicist would judge it to be morally good. Thus, for example, a society may define as a 
common good giving precedence to economic development over political development—or expect that 
all members adhere to a particular religion. Many may not consider it a good society, but it is the good 
the given society has formulated as its common good. 
Several scholars made strong arguments against the kind of balancing approach here 
followed. They argue that rights are a common good, and that hence the very opposition of the two 
goods—rights and the common good-- the balancing analysis presupposes, is a false one. This view 
is held particularly with regard to freedom of speech, taking inspiration from Justice Holmes’ dissent in 
Abrams v. United States (1919)16 that the “ultimate good,” both for the individual and society, is “better 
reached by free trade in ideas.” It is expressed in the FCC’s opinion that “the public interest is best 
served by permitting free expression of views.” Likewise, Scott Cummings points out that many believe 
that “strong protection for individual rights is itself advancing the public interest17 
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At first, it may seem that one can resolve this issue by granting that common goods are a 
right. For instance, instead of referring to security as a common good, one can recognize a right to be 
safe, or a right to life.18 However, such redefinition does not vacate or obviate the balancing question. 
It merely moves it from asking about the balance between a good and a right to—the balance between 
adhering to two rights that command different pubic policies and behaviors. One can speak about the 
difference between what the right to privacy and the right to safety call for, but this change in wording 
leaving standing the question toward which right the nation is titling in a given period, and where it 
ought to tilt.  
           One next notes that many common goods are not recognized as rights either in the US 
constitution or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There is no right to national parks, historical 
preservation, or public health, or basic research. One can of course aspire to add these rights, but 
until they are recognized as such, one best not dismiss the normative claims for these goods because 
they are “merely” common goods and not individual rights. 
         Last but not least, some common goods cannot be reasonably defined as individual 
rights. The National Archive in Washington DC houses the original copy of the Constitution. There is a 
clear common good. However, to argue that individual Americans have a right to have the constitution 
preserved is stretching the concept of right to the point it becomes meaningless and has no foundation 
either in American core normative concepts nor legal traditions.   
        The following application of the liberal communitarian balancing approach to the analysis 
of the balancing of individual rights and the common good in three major area of law—free speech, 
public safety, and eminent domain—provides an opportunity to test the suggestion that this mode of 
analysis is quite productive. 
. 
 
II. FREE SPEECH: SURPRISING HOMAGE TO THE COMMON GOOD 
 
There is a rather wide consensus that the U.S. Supreme Court has tilted heavily in favor of the 
right to free speech, and showed little concern for the common good (other than the common good 
free speech itself engenders) when serving it entails curbing free speech. The U.S. legal and 
normative commitment to free speech is considered one of the strongest in the world. The text of the 
First Amendment, which enshrines this right, reads unequivocally that “Congress shall make no law … 
abridging the freedom of speech.”19 The U.S. tolerates hate speech that several other democracies 
have banned, such as holocaust denial, racist speech, and fascist speech, and the Supreme Court 
has generally overturned laws that ban speech based on its hateful or otherwise distasteful content.20 
The Supreme Court has also set an extremely high bar on restricting speech based on its advocacy of 
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violence or illegality; such speech must be likely to cause “imminent lawless action” to lose First 
Amendment protection.21 Almost no speech clears this bar, in the Court’s view. 
True, this strong interpretation of the First Amendment was gained only in the 1920s, following 
the founding of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the influential dissents of Justices 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis in Abrams v. U.S., which eventually convinced the 
Court majority to adopt much stricter standards for legal restrictions on speech.22 Previously, the Court 
had been much more communitarian in this matter. This is evident in cases such as Rosen v. United 
States (upholding a conviction for mailing “obscene” material),23 Schenck v. U. S. (upholding a 
conviction for criticizing the draft),24 and Abrams v. U. S. (upholding a conviction for criticizing war 
production),25 which permitted significant content-based restrictions on speech. However, beginning in 
the 1920s, the Court became a very strong defender of the right to free speech. And this right was 
extended in in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) to permit “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” 
unless likely to incite “imminent lawless action,”26 and extended further in Hess v. Indiana (1973), to 
permit speech with a “tendency to lead to violence” unless “intended to produce, and likely to produce, 
imminent disorder.”27 Other rights-broadening rulings included National Socialist Party of America v. 
Village of Skokie (requiring “strict procedural safeguards” to for a state to obstruct a neo-Nazi march in 
a neighborhood of Holocaust survivors);28 Texas v. Johnson (allowing flag burning);29 Snyder v. 
Phelps (ruling speech on a public issue in a public place not liable to a tort of emotional distress, even 
if “outrageous” in content and context);30 and McCullen v. Coakley (invalidating a “buffer zone” against 
protests near an abortion clinic).31 
At first blush, one may argue that the 1973 ruling about obscenity in Miller v. California,32 laid 
out clear content-based guidelines about impermissible speech, and hence shows that the Court in 
this area was willing to accord great weight to what it perceived as a common good. However, in 
practice, obscenity laws are “rarely enforced and widely ignored,”33 not least due to the vagueness of 
parts of the Miller test. Similarly, having determined in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)34 that 
“fighting words” that provoke violent retaliation are not protected by the First Amendment, the Court 
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proceeded to weaken that ruling in subsequent decisions and has not found any speech to qualify as 
fighting words in the cases that followed.35 
As for the incitement or advocacy of violence, while the Court upheld in Whitney v. California 
(1927)36 the prohibition of speech threatening to “incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or threaten 
[the] overthrow [of government] by unlawful means,” it overturned that standard in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio (1969),37 interpreting the “clear and present danger” standard for unprotected speech of Schenck 
v. United States (1919)38 as limited to that likely and intended to produce “imminent lawless action.” As 
the concurrence acknowledged, such a standard only applies in very “rare instances.” The bar for 
finding that speech constitutes such incitement has been set so high that the prosecution finds it next 
to impossible to clear it, and thus serves as a powerful speech protection, particularly given that the 
Court upheld this protection in subsequent cases.39 One notable exception has been in terrorism 
cases, where the Brandenburg test has been bypassed or applied by lower courts on shaky grounds,40 
and where the Supreme Court held that material support for terrorist organizations through forms of 
speech such as legal services and advice, is not protected by the First Amendment.41 
At first it may seem that the Court’s upholding of laws against child pornography is a major 
exception to its very strong protection of free speech. However, it is important to note that, even in the 
case of such a popularly detested42 form of speech, the Court justified its restrictions on child 
pornography not with reference to the harm associated with viewing or distributing child pornography 
to the moral fabric of society or to the debasement of the culture, but rather to the specific harm 
inflicted on children as actors who play a role in its production! Thus, in New York v. Ferber (1982),43 
the Court upheld a statute banning child pornography on the basis that the “prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance,” and 
in Osborne v. Ohio (1990),44 the Court upheld a ban on the mere possession of child pornography, 
first of all, on the basis of “compelling interests in protecting the physical and psychological wellbeing 
of minors.”  
Moreover, the Court explicitly denied in Osborne any “paternalistic interest in regulating [the] 
mind” for fear that obscenity would poison the minds of its viewers,” and it made clear in Ferber that its 
ruling was limited to “live performances and photographic reproductions,” not all child pornography per 
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(1982); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
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 See eg United States v. Rahman 189 F.3d 88; Thomas Healy, Brandenburg In A Time Of Terror, 84:2Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 655 
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 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) 
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 See for example Daniel P. Mears et al, Sex Crimes, Children, and Pornography: Public Views and Public Policy, 
54:4 Crime and Delinquency 532 (2008) accessed at http://cad.sagepub.com/content/54/4/532.full.pdf+html 
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 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) 
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se. This distinction was affirmed in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002),45 when the Court held 
that a ban on virtual child (that is, not involving real children) pornography was “overbroad and 
unconstitutional” as it “also prohibits speech having serious redeeming value.” In short, the Court’s 
rulings have sought to limit child pornography as employment, not as speech issue. Even here the 
Court refused to limit speech to defend a common good, however good it may seem to many people. 
This paper will not deal with the Court’s rulings on libel and defamation, as these forms of 
speech are disputed mainly on the basis of harm to individuals rather than to the common good. It also 
does not cover the Court’s treatment of money used in election campaigns as speech because the 
rulings  involved  raise such a great number of other issues that they commands a separate treatment. 
 Given the Court’s very strong defense of free speech in the contentious areas of 
obscenity, provocation, and incitement, not found in other democracies, one might conclude that the 
Court has little regard for public interests in this area, and takes an absolutist approach to free speech 
rights. Indeed, this is a position often articulated both in public discourse and in the academy. Some 
find that the “absolutist free speech model in the United States” is “foundationally very different and 
much more protective of liberty […] than those of Europe or Canada,46 while others bemoan the 
“absolutist' position” and “ideological refusal to acknowledge [the] dangerous implications for the 
growth of hate speech.”47 However, we find that the Court has taken a surprisingly communitarian 
position in one area—in greatly limiting the time, place, and manner (TPM) of speech, in order to serve 
a variety of communitarian interests that do not command nearly as much normative standing as 
avoiding violence, inter group hatred, or degrading the moral culture.  
Thus, the Court upheld Los Angeles’ ban on posting fliers on public property, given the city’s 
interests in “preventing visual clutter, minimizing traffic hazards, and preventing interference with the 
intended use of public property.”48 It upheld permit requirements that limit marches on public streets in 
order to protect “public convenience”49 rather than speech. Other relevant cases concern those in 
which the Court upheld a ban on sound trucks that emit “loud and raucous noises” given the “need for 
reasonable protection in the homes or business houses from the distracting noises,”50 as well as a ban 
on noisy protests on school grounds on the basis of “compelling interest in having an undisrupted 
school session.”51 And, it upheld a statute forcing performers to use government-provided sound 
equipment and technicians to ensure that performances in a certain venue were not too loud.52 
Many other TPM rulings limit speech to provide noise controls. For example, the Court upheld 
a ban on picketing outside residential homes in order to protect the “wellbeing, tranquility, and privacy 
of the home,” an “important aspect” of which is “the protection of unwilling listeners […] from the 
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intrusion of objectionable or unwanted speech.”53 That is of course the kind of speech champions of 
the First Amendment hold is which most protecting.   
The Court has been willing, consistently, to limit speech for common goods that may be 
justified but command less of a standing in the society’s scale of values as those it left almost 
completely unprotected.  
One may argue that the Court found it much easier to limit speech causes served by TPM 
limitations on speech because these restrictions are content neutral, while to serve other causes might 
well entail limiting speeches of one kind of content (e.g. radical) and not others (e.g. moderate). 
However, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany, and Australia are among the nations 
that were able to set such content-based limits, and still free speech thrives in these countries and 
they are considered solid democracies. Moreover, American society has erected strong taboos 
against select terms and symbols, for instance the N word, leading to firing of news anchors and 
benching of sport stars if they use it, illustrating that one can draw a content line without this sliding 
down a slippery slope of censorship or otherwise suppressing free speech.      
In short, it seems quite clear that the Court is willing to allow the most profound sensibilities of 
the majority of Americans to be offended (e.g. by flag burning); let their emotions and values be 
assaulted (e.g. when their bury their fallen soldiers ); tolerate speech that promotes hate in the most 
vile terms, and even allow speech that may well  incite violence or riots—but ban speech that may 
disrupt the slumber of some suburbanites or upset the tranquility of the downtown business 
community. Instead of being particularly uncommunitarian when it comes to free speech, by greatly 
privileging this right, the Court showed itself repeatedly to be willing to curb speech for relatively light 
common goods and not for the weightiest ones. 
 
III. PUBLIC SAFETY: UNCLEAR BUT PRESENT BALANCE 
 
A review of Supreme Court rulings shows that the Court has a broad understanding of public 
safety that allows diverse intrusions into the realm of individual rights to serve this common good. The 
most basic element of public safety is upholding of law and order, the deterrence and prevention of 
crime (Many cases in point are cited below). A second element of public safety relates to preventing 
accidental death and injury. Thus, the Court allowed suspicion less random drug and alcohol testing of 
train engineers in the wake of a series of train accidents,54 as well as random sobriety checkpoints on 
highways to prevent deadly car accidents resulting from drunk driving.55 A third element of public 
safety is the promotion of public health. Thus, the Court held that the public interest in eradicating the 
smallpox disease justified compulsory vaccination programs,56 despite the resulting intrusion on 
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privacy, and held that search warrants for Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) inspections do 
not require “probable cause in the criminal law sense.”57 
 
Another element is the promotion of national security and counterterrorism. This element is not 
encompassed in this examination because of great differences between this public good and the 
others under study.  
In seeking to determine where to draw the communitarian balance in this area, the Court very 
often draws on the Fourth Amendment. This Amendment captures well the basic thesis of the liberal 
communitarian way of thinking. By banning only unreasonable searches and seizures,58 the Fourth 
Amendment recognizes, on the face of it, a category of reasonable searches, which turn out typically 
to be those that promote public safety and do not require a warrant or probable cause. That is, the 
very text speaks of two sides, and hence of a balance, in sharp contrast to the First Amendment, 
which states “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech.”59 
Finally, disregarding those who oppose the very notion of balancing,60  the Court determines 
whether searches are reasonable through “the balancing of competing interests,” which the Court 
views as the “key principle of the Fourth Amendment.”61 Thus, the Court weighs the “nature and 
quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the 
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion”62 to determine whether “the totality of the 
circumstances justified a particular sort of search or seizure.”63 The Fourth Amendment is thus a 
liberal communitarian text par excellence. 
In seeking the point of balance between individual rights and public safety, the Court has used 
a variety of criteria, each with its own rationale.  The result is a complex, difficult, and at times 
wavering or inconsistent approach.  Thus, the Court adopted in 1948 the “cardinal rule that, in seizing 
goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants wherever 
reasonably practicable,”64 only to assert two years later, following the appointment of new justices, that 
the “relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search 
was reasonable” based on “the facts and circumstances of each case.” The following review of several 
of the Court’s key positions on public safety reveals that in a considerable number of cases, the Court 
places a high value on public safety when balanced against individual rights.  The review strictly aims 
to support conclusion rather than attempt to provide a comprehensive review of all or even most 
relevant cases. 
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1. Exigent Circumstances 
 
One criterion used by the Court to balance public safety and individual rights is the presence 
of “exigent circumstances” that make a warrantless search or seizure “imperative,” for instance, when 
an emergency creates an urgent need for police to act.65 The Court has held such emergencies to 
include the pursuit of a fleeing suspect, the imminent destruction of evidence, and the “need to protect 
or preserve life or avoid serious injury.”66 
Two cases illustrate this criterion. In Warden v. Hayden (1967),67 the Court upheld the 
warrantless entry of police into a private house to pursue a fleeing armed robbery suspect, on the 
ground that to “require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation” might “gravely 
endanger their lives or the lives of others.” Having concluded the search was reasonable, the Court 
also rejected the broader principle that police may only search a home for, and seize, evidence in 
which the state has some property interest (such as stolen goods), holding instead that searches for 
“mere evidence” of a crime  do not violate constitutional protections against self-incrimination. Thus, 
the Court qualified both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in order to promote public safety.  
 In Kentucky v. King (2011),68 the Court upheld the warrantless entry of police into an 
apartment after officers smelled marijuana, knocked on the door, and heard what they suspected to be 
the destruction of evidence. In this case, the Court held that “exigent circumstances—the need to 
prevent destruction of evidence—justified the warrantless entry,” despite the fact the police “created” 
the exigent circumstance by knocking on the door, because the knock itself did not constitute a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Although cases such as this one have broadened the exigent 
circumstances exception, it should be noted that exigent circumstances are in general narrowly 
defined.69 The Court refuses to apply this exception when the timing of a search is not urgent or the 
“gravity of the underlying offense” is minor.70 Thus, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court held that 
suspicion of drunk driving did not constitute an exigent circumstance justifying warrantless police entry 
into the suspect’s home to arrest him. 
  
2. Special Needs and Administrative Searches 
 
In seeking criteria to ferret out the liberal communitarian balance, the Court carved out a very 
large category of exceptions to the need for individualized suspicion and Court approval, namely 
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administrative searches that are justified by “special needs beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.” Most deal with searches that do not involve criminal investigations, for instance, routine 
inspections by personnel from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  The category also 
includes warrantless searches by administrative authorities in public schools, government offices, and 
prisons; drug testing of public transportation and other government employees; and inspection of 
automobile junkyards and dismantling operations.  
In all of these cases “the warrant and probable cause requirements are dispensed with in favor 
of a reasonableness standard that balances the government's regulatory interest against the 
individual's privacy interest; in all of these instances the government's interest has been found to 
outweigh the individual's.”71 
A key precedent for the “special needs” exception is Skinner v. Railway Lab. Execs. Ass'n 
(1989),72 where the Court allowed suspicion less, warrantless drug and alcohol testing of train 
engineers in the wake of a series of train accidents. In that case, the Court held that, while such tests 
do constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment, they are “reasonable” searches because the 
government’s “compelling” interest in ensuring “the safety of the traveling public” outweighs the 
employees’ privacy concerns.  
Similar considerations affected the Court’s ruling in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz 
(1990),73 which upheld warrantless sobriety tests at random highways checkpoints. In that case, while 
acknowledging that checkpoint stops constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
denied the respondents’ argument that such stops failed to serve a “special need.” Instead, the Court 
pointed to the “magnitude of the drunken driving problem [and] the States' interest in eradicating it,” as 
well as the Court’s approval of similar checkpoints to search for illegal immigrants in United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte (1976)74. Applying a balancing test, the Court found the privacy intrusion of sobriety 
checkpoint stops to be small and the effectiveness of the program to be adequate.  
For those who are not tutored in the law, the author included, this special needs’ category 
could be divided into several subcategories that seem reasonable. In one, the acts of those subject to 
search without judicial review are those can directly and significantly endanger the lives of others, e.g. 
train engineers. “Directly and significantly” is added to limit this subcategory because a very large 
number of people have some effect on the probability that someone will be hurt. Another sub category 
is where enforcement is regulatory and cannot results in criminal charges, for instance ensuring that 
restaurant workers maintain safe food handling practices and personal hygiene. A third subcategory is 
when it is not practical to seek a warrant because a very large number of people needs to be searched 
in short order. One example of this is when the police set up sobriety checkpoints on New Year’s Eve. 
Another is the screening gates first introduced into US airports in 1972, which stopped sky jacking 
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effectively but were challenged by the ACLU.75 In all these kinds of case, the Court privileged the 




A third criterion used by the Court to balance public safety and individual rights is the presence 
of consent. Simply put, individuals are free to waive their Fourth Amendment protection against 
warrantless searches and seizures by consenting to the search or seizure in question. At first blush, 
one may think that this criterion does not affect the balance because consent is willingly granted. 
However, many people are not aware of their right to refuse to consent. In contrast to the Fifth 
Amendment’s Miranda warning requirement, the Court held that police do not need to inform an 
individual of their right to refuse consent to a search or seizure.76 Moreover, authority to consent may 
be shared among multiple individuals (for instance, among roommates) with only the consent of one 
required for police to search. In dealing with such questions, the Court’s rulings reveal that even in this 
matter the Court has tended to favor the public interest over individual rights. Thus, the Court held that 
consent to a search of joint property may be given by either resident in the other’s absence,77 though if 
both owners are present, either may refuse consent.78 Even the latter limitation on the consent 
exception is qualified by the fact that police may still enter a shared home if they suspect domestic 
violence to have occurred.  (Somewhat offsetting these tilts towards the public safety, the Court does 
limit the consent exception by holding that burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove that consent 




A fourth criterion used by the Court draws on the extent individual rights are intruded upon 
than on the weight accorded to the specific public interest involved, drawing on concerns  about the 
level of intrusiveness engendered by a given search or seizure . Put another way, the Court is more 
likely to consider upholding a warrant exception for a search or seizure—whatever the common 
good—if the government action is minimally intrusive. Thus, in reference to seizure of a suspected 
container of illegal drugs, the Court articulated that “seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness,” 
and “when the nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth 
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Amendment interests, the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less 
than probable cause.”80 
Two examples illustrate the role of the level of intrusiveness in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
balancing. On the one hand, in Maryland v. King (2013),81 the Court upheld compulsory DNA sampling 
of those arrested based on probable cause of serious crimes, in large part due to the limited 
intrusiveness of the search. Having already concluded that the public safety interest in identifying 
suspects was great and that DNA sampling significantly furthered that interest—the Court went on to 
argue that the “intrusion of a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample is minimal” as it involves “virtually no 
risk, trauma, or pain,” and furthermore that police DNA databases do “not intrude on […] privacy in a 
way that would make [such] DNA identification unconstitutional.” The Court held this finding that the 
intrusion was “negligible” to be of “central relevance to determining reasonableness.”  
 On the other end of this scale, the Court held in Tennessee v. Garner (1985),82 largely on the 
basis of level of intrusiveness, that use of deadly force against an unarmed, fleeing burglary suspect 
was unconstitutional. In this case, the Court acknowledged that “burglary is a serious crime” and that 
police had probable cause to arrest the suspect. However, given that the “intrusiveness of a seizure by 
means of deadly force is unmatched,” it ruled the seizure to be unconstitutional (rejecting the 
argument that killing the suspect would make other suspects more likely to surrender). Note, however, 
that the Court did not rule out the use of deadly force entirely, but instead limited it to situations where 
“the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or 
serious physical injury,” thus avoiding excessive harm to public safety interests. 
 
5. Expectation of privacy 
 
A fifth criterion used by the Court is the expectation of privacy, which to a significant extent tilts 
in favor of the individual rights’ side of the communitarian equation. The Court’s analysis of privacy 
expectations originates in its ruling in Katz v. United States (1967),83 which held that although what 
“what a person knowingly exposes to the public” is not protected by the Fourth Amendment”—“what 
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public” may be protected as long as 
the person exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as “reasonable.” Since 
then, the Katz test has been criticized for being circular and subjective, and for leading to mixed 
results in Fourth Amendment cases.84 For the purposes of this discussion, it suffices to point out that 
the Court’s evaluation of specific privacy expectations has favored the public interest in several key 
cases. 
One notable example is found in California v. Greenwood, where the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect against warrantless search and seizure of garbage left outside 
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the home, which had been conducted by the police to support a search warrant for a drug raid on a 
nearby house. In this ruling, the Court argued that an expectation of privacy in items discarded “in an 
area particularly suited for public inspection” is “not objectively reasonable.”85 
Also, the Court held in Smith v. Maryland (1979) that the tracking by a phone company (at 
police request) of phone numbers dialed by a suspect did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment. In this ruling, the Court held that the suspect “in all probability entertained no actual 
expectation of privacy” in his calling records, and such an expectation would not have been 
“legitimate,” given that telephone users “typically know […] that the company has facilities for 
recording this information and does, in fact, record it for various legitimate business purposes.”86 This 
case set an important precedent for the “third party doctrine,” which holds that information shared with 
third parties is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.87 As advances in information technology have 
led third parties to play an increasingly important role in storing and transmitting otherwise confidential 
information, this doctrine increasingly privileges the public interest side of the communitarian equation 
by facilitating law enforcement access to personal information. 
 
6. Additional considerations 
 
The five criteria listed above are not a comprehensive list of factors considered by the Court in 
balancing public safety and individual rights. In its extensive Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
Court has formulated several other specific exceptions and qualifications to the Fourth Amendment 
warrant, probable cause, and individualized suspicion requirements—and provided additional rationale 
for so ruling. Thus, the Court held that warrantless searches of automobiles are permitted given 
probable cause,88 that searches at international borders require neither warrants nor probable cause,89 
and that that evidence in “plain view” during a legitimate search may be seized,90 giving different 
rationales in each case, although some partially overlap with those already cited above.   
Some argue that the Court’s rulings over the last few decades have steadily undermined 
individual rights, particularly privacy, by favoring public safety considerations in Fourth Amendment 
cases. Thus, Thomas N. McInnis argues that the Court’s changing interpretations of the amendment 
have eroded the warrant requirement over time. William Stuntz finds that the Court’s change of 
emphasis in focusing on “unreasonable searches and seizures” rather than the warrant clause has 
narrowed the scope of the warrant requirement. Andrew Talai holds that, “in the last few decades, the 
Supreme Court has narrowed its vision of Fourth Amendment rights to an opaque privacy rationale.” 
Shaun Spencer states that changing technology, coupled with the Court’s “reasonable expectations” 
doctrine of privacy, facilitates the incremental erosion of privacy. Likewise, Shima Baradaran notes 
that the Court has tended to favor the government when balancing individual rights and public safety 
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in recent Fourth Amendment cases because the Fourth Amendment case is typically made by a 
“criminal defendant whose hands are dirty.” For his part, Christopher Slobogin argues that the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has failed to keep pace with evolving government surveillance 
techniques.91 
At the same time, no one claims that all the cases lined up on one side of liberal 
communitarian balancing equation. Any such trend is offset in part by two factors: the Court’s 
restricting warrantless searches in recent cases, and its creation of new rights. The Court has 
introduced and clarified new rights though mainly in the 1960s. The Court introduced the Miranda 
right,92 and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard, which, for all its limits, has upheld 
individual rights against public safety concerns in contexts where a different Fourth Amendment 
doctrine might not have, as with thermal imaging93 and use of drug-sniffing dogs94 on the periphery of 
a house.  
More recently, in Riley v. California (2014)95 the Court limited the warrant exception for 
searches incident to a lawless arrest by affirming that police searches of arrestees’ cell phone data 
require a warrant. The Court also limited the privacy expectations doctrine in U.S. v. Jones,96 holding 
that surreptitious police attachment of a GPS surveillance device to a suspect’s car violated his Fourth 
Amendment property rights, thus constituting a “search” regardless of privacy expectations. 
Commentators have argued that Riley and Jones, respectively, “brought the Fourth Amendment into 
the digital age”97 and “bode well for continued protection of citizens’ public privacy rights.”98 
In short, whether one finds that the Court has found a sound liberal communitarian balance, or 
that it has tilted too heavily toward either the public safety or the individual rights side of the balancing 
equation, there is no question that the Court accorded considerable weight to the public interest.  
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IV. EMINENT DOMAIN: OPENINGS TO CAPTURE 
 
A third area in which we study the Supreme Court balancing of the common good and 
individual rights is that of eminent domain, or the expropriation of private property by the government 
in the service of one public interest or another. The legal concept of eminent domain is based on the 
Fifth Amendment takings clause, which reads, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”99 In 1875, the Court asserted that the clause “contains an implied 
recognition” of eminent domain: “[what is the] provision that private property shall not be taken for 
public use without just compensation […] but an implied assertion that, on making just compensation, 
it may be taken?”100 As a result, the Court affirmed the Federal Government’s “power to appropriate 
lands or other property within the states for its own uses,” arguing that such power is “essential to its 
independent existence and perpetuity”101 and “is an attribute of sovereignty.”102 The Court’s 
subsequent rulings concerned defining what uses of confiscated property may qualify as “public use,” 
and thus are constitutionally valid.  
The Court recognized that eminent domain may be used to secure property for government 
buildings; water, transportation, communications, and energy infrastructure; and national defense.103 
The Court also upheld the use of eminent domain for “public buildings,” including “for forts, armories, 
and arsenals, for navy yards and lighthouses, for custom houses, post offices, and courthouses, and 
for other public uses.”104 Subsequent rulings affirmed that eminent domain could be used to secure 
land for memorial sites,105 aqueducts,106 canals,107 railroads,108 war production,109 and public parks.110  
State legislatures and state and federal courts also permitted the use of eminent domain by 
private entities, such as canal, railroad, and turnpike companies, to build transportation infrastructure 
to which the public would have access,111 as well as for electricity and lighting infrastructure,112 oil 
pipelines,113 telephone lines,114 and cable and fiber optic lines.115 
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In Berman v. Parker (1954)116 the Court permitted the state not only to seize property for literal 
“public use” (whether under private or public ownership), but also to transfer property to a new private 
owner for their own private use, albeit in pursuit of some broader “public purpose.” Specifically, the 
Court found that the use eminent domain to facilitate “urban renewal” programs was a justifiable way 
to deal with “urban blight,” or slum conditions. The Court deferred to Congress and state legislatures 
to determine what qualifies as a “public purpose” justifying eminent domain, upholding “all means 
necessary and appropriate” to deal with conditions “injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and 
welfare.”  As such, the Court upheld in Berman both the seizure of non-blighted property within a 
blighted area in pursuit of a comprehensive development plan, and the transfer of property to another 
private owner for private, rather than public, use.            
The Court noted that while the government’s “police power” had been traditionally associated 
with “public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order,” these examples “merely 
illustrate the scope of the power, and do not delimit it,” as the “concept of the public welfare is broad 
and inclusive […] The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary.”117 
Taking Berman as precedent, another unanimous ruling upheld a Hawaii land reform program 
intended to broaden land ownership, accepting the Hawaii Legislature’s position that “concentrated 
land ownership was responsible for skewing the State's residential fee simple market, inflating land 
prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare,” and reaffirming that “regulating oligopoly and the 
evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers.”118 In making this judgment, the 
Court broadened the precedent from Berman, arguing that while taking “one person's property […] for 
the benefit of another [requires a] justifying public purpose […] It is not essential that the entire 
community, nor even any considerable portion… directly enjoy or participate [for it] to constitute a 
public use.”  
Continuing this trend, the Court’s 5-4 ruling in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) held that the 
government may also use eminent domain to transfer private property from one owner to another, in 
this case from the residents of a neighborhood to a private developer, not only to deal with blight but 
merely “for the purpose of economic development,” with no obligation on the new owner to perform a 
public function or grant public access.119 The Court deferred to the “city's determination that the area 
at issue was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation,” arguing that 
“because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the 
Fifth Amendment.” Thus, the Court rejected the argument that “economic development does not 
qualify as a public use,” countering that “promoting economic development is a traditional and long 
accepted governmental function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it from the other 
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public purposes.” Crucially, it rejected calls for “’reasonable certainty’ that the expected public benefits 
will actually accrue” (such as a legal obligation on the developer to meet certain economic goals), 
noting the “departure from the Court's precedent” and “disadvantages of a heightened form of review” 
that such requirements would entail.    
The Kelo ruling greatly weakened the safeguards against eminent domain abuse, much 
increasing the incentive for private interests to influence regulators, while reducing the potential for 
public accountability. That is not to argue that eminent domain in line with Kelo cannot serve the public 
interest. Defenders of Kelo point out that “residential condemnation for redevelopment” is rare, and in 
most states is required to produce more and better low-income housing.120 By watering down the 
definition of public use, however, the ruling greatly increased the risk that special interests will capture 
the process. Thus, Justice O’Connor, arguing for the minority, warned that the “specter of 
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with 
a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory […] The beneficiaries are 
likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including 
large corporations and development firms.” Even Justice Kennedy, who concurred with the judgment, 
warned that courts must still strike down any taking “that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a 
particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”  He argued that they should 
“treat the objection as [serious] and review the record to see if it has merit” when “confronted with a 
plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism to private parties.” Finally he suggested that there 
“may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is 
so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use 
Clause.”121 
It is important to note that the “blight” standard for eminent domain in place prior to Kelo 
already created opportunities for abuse, due to the broad definition of blight which critics argue 
includes “vague and subjective criteria” that could apply to virtually any property,122 and the permissive 
process for its determination (which critics allege facilitates rent-seeking and regulatory capture 
behavior by developers, and suffers from excessive deference by the judiciary.)123 Most notoriously, 
the mid-20th century urban renewal projects facilitated by Berman, while having some positive 
economic impact,124 are generally seen even by today’s proponents of eminent domain125 to have 
been racially discriminatory in their motivations and impact, as they tended to displace African 
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American and Puerto Rican communities,126 thereby reinforcing racial segregation127 and leading 
critics to dub such programs “Negro Removal.” 
Martin Gold and Lynne Sagalin find  that a “large and strong coalition of mutual interests 
supports redevelopment,” including “city officials, redevelopment agencies, urban planners, real estate 
consultants and attorneys, developers, and environmental interest groups,” making abuse of eminent 
domain more likely. Whereas the government may be held accountable by taxpayers for condemning 
property and then failing to use that property productively, private interests are less accountable. 
Thus, Nancy Kubasek and Garrett Coyle warn that 
 
Because corporations do not face consequences if their estimates to the 
legislature differ from reality, a moral hazard problem is present: 
corporations have an incentive to overstate the number of jobs and the 
amount of tax revenue they will create given a suitable site. Moreover . . . 
the judiciary cannot review the likelihood that the public benefit targeted by 
the taking will be achieved. The logical corollary of this moral hazard 
problem is that legislatures may press for eminent domain condemnations to 
which they would never have consented had they known the actual or even 
likely outcomes.128 
 
Likewise, Ilya Somin takes issue with the Court’s deference to the legislature on this issue:  
 
Among all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, only the public use limitation 
is singled out for heavy [judicial] deference’129 […] There is little sense in 
recognizing a constitutional right for the purpose of curbing abuses of 
government power, and then leaving the definition of that right up to the 
discretion of the very officials whose power the right is supposed to 
restrict.130 
  
The issues noted by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have had negative impacts in practice. 
In the case of the Fort Trumbull neighborhood of New London, the subject of the Kelo ruling, the 
expropriation and demolition of the residential and commercial property in question was never 
followed by the promised economic development. Pfizer, the pharmaceutical company on behalf of 
which eminent domain was exercised, not only failed to develop the area but ended its operations 
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there. Instead of the expected hotel, conference center, condominium complex, health club, and 
shopping area, Fort Trumbull is now a “vast, empty field […] entirely uninhabited.”131 This was not an 
isolated incident: the “most famous economic development taking” prior to Kelo, Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,132 condemned a residential area in order to build a General 
Motors factory that likewise became an expensive failure.133   
Following Kelo, economic growth has justified using eminent domain to acquire property even 
for development projects of questionable social utility, for example casinos in New Jersey.134 In New 
York City both the Columbia University Harlem expansion and the Atlantic Yards project were accused 
by opponents of “questionable determination of blight,” collusion between developers and regulators, 
and ignoring community input.135 Furthermore, a 2012 study on “judicial biographies and takings 
decisions since 1975”  concluded that “decisions favoring physical takings increase [economic] growth 
by 0.2% points but reduce minority home ownership and employment by 0.5% and 0.3% points 
respectively”.136 
Kelo drew adverse public and legislative reaction, including a 365-33 vote in the House of 
Representatives to condemn the ruling, denunciations from public figures and organizations across 
the political spectrum, and critical public opinion polls.137 Embracing Kelo’s caveat that “nothing in our 
opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power,” and 
responding to the “intensity and broad-based, nonpartisan character of the backlash,”138 a large 
number of state legislatures passed some form of eminent domain reform. The Institute for Justice, 
which campaigned for eminent domain and blight standards reform following Kelo, asserts that 23 
states have passed “substantive eminent domain reform” and 21 states have added lesser “eminent 
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domain protections” since 2005, leaving only six without significant reform.139 The intensity and 
effectiveness of these reforms varied: a few eliminated blight as a condition for eminent domain, 
others narrowed the definition of blight to more closely fit its original meaning as conditions 
“detrimental to or an actual danger to public health and safety,” and still others narrowed the scope of 
blight determination to focus on individual units more than whole areas.140 
Political science developed a considerable body of scholarship on what is called “capture 
theory.” It refers to conditions in which private interests gain control of a public asset or process, and 
employ it to do their bidding, thus voiding its contribution to the common good.141 Capture comes in 
several forms including regulatory capture (when those that are to be regulated use the regulations to 
advance their special interests) and legislative capture (in which private interests  pervert the 
democratic process, often by passing laws that seem to serve the public interest but actually rain 
down benefits on limited private groups). Capture is often achieved through campaign contributions, 
sometimes referred to as legalized bribery, and sometimes through illegal means. The preceding 
discussion of eminent domain suggests that the judicial process can also be captured. This is 
especially likely to occur when judges are elected rather than appointed and must raise camping funds 
in order to increase their chances of becoming elected, a recent trend.  
All this shows that a sound liberal communitarian policy needs not merely a carefully crafted 
balance between the public interest and individual rights, and one that is recalibrated as conditions 
change significantly—but that it also requires ensuring that the purposes served are indeed public 
goods. This brings us full circle. We started by showing that one can distinguish the public good from 
those sought by private parties, and we now see that without such a clear line,  there is a danger that 
the concept of public good will be abused by special interests, many of which serve neither the 
common good nor individual rights but merely their particular members.   
 
V. IN CONCLUSION  
 
We have seen the common good (or the public interest) can be defined and that liberal 
communitarian philosophy suggests that a good society will draw a carefully crafted balance between 
the common good and individual rights. Moreover, this balance will be recalibrated as historical 
conditions change. We found that the Court treatment of the First Amendment is much more willing to 
curb free speech for common goods that seem not to command nearly the same normative standing 
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as those the Court shortchanged. Free speech protection would be very little undermined if the Court 
set limits on hate speech similar to those society in effect has set, thus enforcing society’s norms and 
incentives; if it protected more the sensibility of people burying their fallen heroes by keeping radical 
zealots further away and by shielding women seeking abortions from aggressive, in-your-face verbal 
abuse.  
We saw that, in dealing with public safety as a common good, the Court came particularly 
close to the liberal communitarian positon, drawing on the text of the Fourth Amendment that bars only 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court made numerous specific rulings in this area, and 
provided different rationales for the various rulings, titling sometime to the public safety and 
sometimes to individual rights. One may argue whether, given the current conditions, it tiled too far 
toward promoting public safety or toward protecting individual rights. Likewise, one can agree that, in 
general, the Court followed a liberal communitarian approach in dealing with taking, in particular with 
eminent domain. The Court in effect created a whole area in which it allows individual rights, in 
particular private property, to be set aside in the service of one common good or another. However, in 
the process, it opened the door to fake public goods, which allow  special interests to use the 
terminology  and legal bases of eminent domain  to serve not the public interests, but their private 
ones, Liberal communitarians need to draw on reforms instituted  by many states to shore up the line 
that separate genuine from faux public goods. 
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